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THE FTC HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE:
A RULE WITHOUT A PRIVATE REMEDY
Jim L. Banks
I. INTRODUCTION
A consumer purchases an appliance from a local dealer. The
consumer signs a credit contract in which he agrees to make
monthly payments, and the dealer agrees to make repairs in case
of a breakdown within one year. In addition, the consumer signs a
promissory note, believing it to be just another part of the con-
tract.1 The appliance dealer sells the promissory note to a finance
company. A few months later, when the appliance breaks down
and the dealer refuses to repair it or the dealer has gone out of
business, the consumer ceases making payments. The finance
company sues the consumer in state court. The consumer is
shocked when the court rules in favor, of the finance company,
finding it immune to all but "real" defenses2 because it is a holder
in due courses of a negotiable instrument 4-the promissory note
signed by the consumer.
In this scenario the finance company's status as a holder in
due course of a negotiable instrument protected it from defenses of
the consumer. The result would have been the same in two other
situations: (1) if the sales contract had contained a waiver of de-
fenses clause5 (which would have given it the same effect as a nego-
tiable instrument), and (2) if the appliance dealer had referred the
consumer to the finance company for a direct loan to pay for the
applicance. All three of these methods separate the seller's duty to
1. In many instances the promissory note is attached to the bottom of the sales con-
tract by perforation. After the consumer signs it, it is detached and sold to a financier.
2. "Real" defenses are enumerated in the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-305 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as UCC]: infancy, incapacity or duress, misrepresentation as to the terms
of the instrument, and discharge in bankruptcy. "Personal" defenses, from which the holder
in due course is immune, are: lack of consideration, unconscionability, fraud in the induce-
ment, and breach of warranty. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 487 (1972).
3. A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument for value and in good
faith and without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense or claim
to it on the part of any person. UCC § 3-302 (1977).
4. To be a negotiable instrument, the instrument must: (1) be signed by the maker, (2)
contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, (3)
be payable on demand or at definite times, and (4) be payable to order or bearer. UCC § 3-
104 (1977).
5. Waivers of defenses are allowed by UCC § 9-206 (1977). An example of a typical
waiver of defenses clause is: "Buyer agrees not to assert any claim or defense which he may
have against the seller as a defense in any action brought by the seller's assignee."
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perform from the buyer's duty to pay.6
All three methods by which financiers are protected from con-
sumers' claims and defenses have been the target of various legisla-
tive and judicial attempts to remove consumer credit transactions
from the world of commercial negotiable instruments. Unfortu-
nately, the Montana Supreme Court has taken such action only on
a limited basis.7 In addition, the Montana statutes on consumer
protection are, at best, ambiguous, and it is not clear whether there
is adequate protection.8
In 1975 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgated its
holder in due course regulation, which preserves consumers' claims
and defenses." The rule preserves these rights by requiring a notice
in all consumer credit contracts. The notice states that the holder
of the contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the
debtor could assert against the seller. Unfortunately, the FTC
holder in due course regulation has a loophole in its enforcement
mechanism. The rule does not give an individual a private right to
enforce compliance with the rule in either federal or state courts.
Moreover, the prospects of enforcement by the FTC on an individ-
ual level are not encouraging.10
This comment discusses the need for a private cause of action
for the Montana consumer in situations where, contrary to the
FTC rule, the consumer credit contract does not include the notice
to holders.1
II. HISTORY OF THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE
In England, in 1758, a promissory note drawn on the Bank of
England was stolen and later sold to a legitimate merchant for a
fair price. Both the original owner and the subsequent purchaser
made a demand for payment on the note. To protect the growing
commercial paper market, the English court 2 determined that the
note should be treated as money and that an innocent purchaser
6. Another method by which the seller's duty to perform is separated from the buyer's
duty to pay is through the use of a credit card. The Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1666 (1976), invalidates waivers of defenses in credit card contracts in those instances
in which a card is used to make a purchase of more than fifty dollars within the state where
the user resides or within 100 miles of the place where the card was issued. This comment
will not discuss credit card transactions.
7. See infra text accompanying note 23.
8. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
9. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-433.3 (1982) (effective date May 14, 1976).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
11. Violations of the FTC rule probably occur most often in the sitution where the
seller directly refers a consumer to a financial institution.
12. Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
[Vol. 44
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for value of a negotiable instrument would not be subject to per-
sonal defenses. 3 The court, holding that the subsequent purchaser
was entitled to payment, reasoned that protecting commercial
transactions was in the best interest of society. If a businessman
had to be concerned with the negotiability of a note, the effective-
ness of the commercial trade system would be hindered. At the
time, England needed a reliable method of transferring wealth
from one merchant to another, since the modern, widespread use
of paper money did not start until 1833.1"
This principle became known as the holder in due course doc-
trine. It was codified in the English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882
and the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law promulgated in the
United States in 1896 and quickly adopted by all the states. The
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was later replaced by the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Over the past 225 years, the
definition of a negotiable instrument has expanded to include such
things as checks, bank drafts, certificates of deposit, and bills of
lading, in addition to promissory notes."5
III. THE BEGINNING OF CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE ABUSE OF
THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE
During the early development of the holder in due course doc-
trine, consumer credit was non-existent. After World War II, the
use of credit to buy personal and household goods grew quickly.
The UCC provisions dealing with negotiable instruments and
rights of a holder in due course allowed financiers to incorporate
into consumer credit transactions an 18th century commercial
banking doctrine which had been developed to protect the com-
mercial paper market.16
Creditors soon found that, where the use of negotiable instru-
ments was forbidden in consumer transactions, 17 they could easily
include a waiver of defenses clause in the sales contract. For all
practical purposes, this waiver gives the creditor the same rights as
a holder in due course. Another method used to deprive the con-
sumer of his defenses is the vendor-related or purchase money
13. See definition of personal defenses supra note 2.
14. Williams, Helping The Market To Work: Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Com-
mission Act And Holder In Due Course, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 137, 140 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Williams].
15. UCC §§ 3-104, 7-104 (1977).
16. Williams, supra note 14, at 139.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 30 & 36.
19831
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loan.'" In this type of loan, the seller directly refers buyers to a
creditor. The loan is considered a direct personal loan, and the
creditor's claim remains independent of the sales agreement be-
tween the seller and the buyer.
These three financing methods are subject to abuse because
they take away the consumer's most effective weapon-
nonpayment. 19 These "cut-off" devices allow dishonest merchants
to collect money on a sales contract despite their continued
breaches of warranty and contract. These unfair practices can be
halted without harm to honest businessmen, and the FTC and
most states have taken measures to prevent such abuse.
IV. JUDICIAL REMEDY-THE CLOSE CONNECTEDNESS DOCTRINE
In 1940, the Arkansas Supreme Court became the first court to
limit the holder in due course doctrine. In Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Childs,2 ° the Arkansas court denied the credit company
the status of a holder in due course because the court found the
company to be too closely connected to the seller. Childs had pur-
chased a car from a dealer who sold the promissory note to Com-
mercial Credit. Childs defaulted on the note, and the credit com-
pany repossessed the car. Childs claimed the dealer had made
fraudulent misrepresentations which induced him to buy the car.
The court upheld the jury verdict for Childs, concluding that the
credit company was a party to the transaction because it was too
closely connected with the seller-assignor to say that it was, in
good faith, an innocent purchaser of the instrument."1 The credit
company had supplied and prepared the forms for the sales con-
tract and promissory note. The assignment of the note was made
the same day Childs signed it, and the credit company had pre-
pared the written assignment to itself even before the note had
been executed.
Over the last forty-two years, this "close connectedness doc-
trine" has been used by numerous jurisdictions,2 2 but its applica-
tion is neither universal nor uniform. Massey-Ferguson Credit
18. See definition infra note 44.
19. FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose for the Trade Regulation Rule Concerning
Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,509 (1975).
20. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
21. Id. at.1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262.
22. See, e.g., Farmers Acceptance Corp. v. DeLozier, 178 Colo. 291, 496 P.2d 1016
(1972); Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Kaw Valley State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Riddle, 219 Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v.
Brown, 173 Mont. 253, 567 P.2d 440 (1977); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405
(1967).
116 [Vol. 44
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Corp. v. Brown"3 is the only Montana case dealing with the doc-
trine. Mr. Brown purchased a used combine from a Massey-Fergu-
son retail dealer. To pay for the combine, Brown traded in an older
combine and signed a sales contract which contained a waiver of
defenses clause. During the sales negotiations, Brown had ex-
pressed concern about certain repairs that were needed on the
combine he was buying, and the dealer promised to make those
repairs. A Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. representative was pre-
sent at the time, and he told Mr. Brown, "His [the dealer's] word
is good. If he says he is going to fix it, he'll fix it."'2 4 The combine
broke down, and the promised repairs were never made.23 Mr.
Brown made no further payments, and the Massey-Ferguson
Credit Corp., the assignee of the contract, reposessed the machine
and sued for a deficiency. Massey-Ferguson claimed the waiver of
defenses clause gave it the status of a holder in due course and
prohibited Mr. "Brown from using the breach of contract defense
against it.26 The Montana Supreme Court found the credit com-
pany was not entitled to the protection provided to a holder in due
course because: (1) the credit company's representative "partici-
pated" in the sale, (2) the credit company supplied the blank sales
contract, and (3) the contract was executed and assigned at the
same time and upon the same instrument.27
Massey-Ferguson is typical of most of the close connectedness
doctrine cases because it leaves the consumer with some unan-
swered questions. What factors or combinations of factors are nec-
essary before the court will find the seller and creditor "close"
enough to deny them holder in due course protection? Were all
three factors present in Massey-Ferguson necessary to find the
seller and creditor closely connected? Would any two factors have
been sufficient? What other factors might the court recognize?
These unanswered questions leave the consumer in an uncertain
position and point out a major weakness in the doctrine. Various
courts have used a variety of factors to decide whether a seller and
23. 169 Mont. 396, 547 P.2d 846 (1976), appeal after remand, 173 Mont. 253, 567 P.2d
440 (1977).
24. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Brown, 169 Mont. 396, 399, 547 P.2d 846, 848
(1976).
25. The dealer went out of business. Massey-Ferguson, 173 Mont. at 254, 567 P.2d at
441 (1977).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-206 (1981) provides that an agreement by a buyer that he
will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller
is enforceable, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument.
27. Massey-Ferguson, 173 Mont. at 255, 567 P.2d at 441.
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a creditor are too closely related.28 This lack of uniformity has re-
sulted in conflicting results from one jurisdiction to another in
cases whose facts are practically identical.29 These conflicting re-
sults and unanswered questions have prompted the majority of
state legislatures to attempt to codify the close connectedness doc-
trine and thereby restrict the holder in due course doctrine in con-
sumer credit transactions.
V. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
A. State Legislative Attempts at Remedies
Forty-five states have enacted legislation dealing with the
holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions,3 *
but only a few have done so in a comprehensive fashion."1 Some
states have prohibited the use of all negotiable instruments other
than checks but continue to allow waiver of defenses clauses,32
while others have prohibited waivers but continue to allow promis-
sory notes."3 Very few states have done anything to deal with the
vendor-related loan. Five states, including Montana, " have no spe-
cific statutes preserving consumers' claims and defenses. This in-
consistent and incomprehensive protection has led to the need for
uniform legislation prohibiting cut-off devices in consumer credit
transactions.
28. Those factors include: (1) common ownership of financier and seller; (2) the
financier takes all of the seller's paper; (3) the financier takes only the seller's paper; (4) the
financier prepares the instruments which the seller procures the buyer to sign; (5) the
financier's name appears on the printed form instrument as endorsee or assignee; (6) the
buyer fills out the instrument on the financier's premises, or with an employee of the
financier being present on the seller's premises; (7) the financier does all credit checks of the
buyer; (8) the financier finances the seller's inventory; (9) the financier has initimate knowl-
edge of the seller's financial condition; and (10) the financier discounts the seller's paper
heavily. Axelrod & Barry, Holder in Due Course-A Memo to Poverty Lawyers, 22 RUTGERS
L. REV. 281, 294-95 (1968).
29. Compare Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1972) with Rehurek
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1972).
30. For a detailed examination of each state's legislation, see Hudak & Carter, The
Erosion of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine: Historical Perspective and Develop-
ment-Part II, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 235 (1977).
31. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9A, §§ 3.307, 3.403, 3.404, tit. 11, § 3-302(5)
(1980); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.406 through 422.409 (1974).
32. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 83.650 (1978).
33. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 97.275 (1979).
34. The other four are Arkansas, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Virginia.
[Vol. 44
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B. Uniform Legislative Remedy-The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U3C), drafted in 1968
and revised in 1974, effectively abrogated the holder in due course
doctrine in consumer cases." The 1974 Act contains provisions
that specifically deal with all three methods of cut-off devices: ne-
gotiable instruments, waiver of defenses clauses, and vendor-re-
lated loans.8 6
Section 3.307 of the U3C provides that a creditor may not take
a negotiable instrument other than a check. Section 3.404 provides
that an assignee of the seller is subject to all claims and defenses of
the consumer against the seller, and that the sales agreement may
not limit or waive the claims or defenses of the consumer. It also
provides that even if a negotible instrument is used in violation of
section 3.307, the holder of that instrument is still subject to the
claims and defenses of the consumer. Section 3.405 extends the
code's policy of preserving consumer claims and defenses to ven-
dor-related or purchase money loans. This section codifies the
close connectedness doctrine and subjects the lender to all claims
and defenses of the consumer against the seller if: (1) the lender
knows that the seller arranged the credit; (2) the lender is related
to the seller; (3) the seller guarantees or assumes the risk of the
loan; (4) the lender supplies the seller with the contract forms, and
the seller participates in the preparation of the form; (5) the loan
is conditioned upon the purchase of property or services from the
particular seller; or (6) the lender has knowledge or notice of sub-
stantial complaints of the seller's failure to perform his contracts.
The consumer must make a good faith effort to obtain satisfaction
from the seller, and the assignee's or lender's liability is limited to
the amount still owing at the time he learns of the claim.
Unfortunately for Montana consumers, Montana has not
adopted the U3C. Only eleven states3s have adopted it, and eight
35. The official comment to secton 3.307 states that a major tenet of the U3C is that
the holder in due course doctrine should be abrogated in consumer cases.
36. The U3C also effectively deals with the problems of holder in due course associ-
ated with the use of credit cards. U3C § 3.403 (1974).
37. U3C §§ 3.404(2), 3.405(2) (1974).
38. Colorado, COLO. Rv. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to 5-9-103 (1973); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 28-
31-101 to 28-39-108 (1980); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to 24-4.5-6-203 (1982); Iowa,
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 537.1101 to 537.7103 (1982); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-1-101 to
16a-9-102 (1981); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 1-101 to 6-415 (1980); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (1972); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-
101 to 37-6-416 (1976); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to 70B-11-105 (1980); Wiscon-
sin, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101 to 427.105 (1974); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 40-14-101 to 40-
14-702 (1977).
1983]
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of those states39 have the 1968 draft which did not cover the ven-
dor-related loan problem. Thus, the lack of protection afforded to
consumers in states that failed to enact adequate legislation
prompted federal intervention.
40
VI. THE FTC HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE-PRESERVATION OF
CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
The FTC holder in due course rule,41 in effect since 1976,
makes it an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 42 for a seller,
43
directly or indirectly, to take a consumer credit contract or accept
as payment the proceeds of any purchase money loan 44 unless the
credit contract made in connection with the sale contains a notice
that any holder of the creditocontract is subject to all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller of the
goods or services.45 With the required notice in the consumer
credit contract, the consumer is protected by state law because the
notice becomes part of the contract and the courts will interpret
the contract as written.
All three cut-off devices are regulated by the rule. The rule
precludes the use of negotiable instruments because any instru-
ment containing the notice would not meet the requirements of ne-
gotiability.46 The rule also prevents the use of a waiver of defenses
clause because if the notice is qualified by additional language, the
contract no longer "contains" the required notice.47 Similarly, the
39. Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
40. FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 19, at 53,506.
41. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-433.3 (1982).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
43. A seller is defined as a person who, in the ordinary course of business, sells or
leases goods or services to consumers. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(j) (1982).
44. A purchase money loan is a cash advance which is received by a consumer in re-
turn for a "Finance Charge" within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act and Regula-
tion Z, which is applied, in whole or substantial part, to a purchase of goods or services from
a seller who (1) refers consumers to the creditor or (2) is affiliated with the creditor by
common control, contract, or business arrangement. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1982).
45. In FTC v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349 (1941), the Supreme Court held that the
FTC lacked authority over § 5 of the FTC Act to regulate any activity not truly interstate in
character. Congress made changes in the FTC Act in 1975. The Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 201, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
41 to 56 (1976)), expanded the FTC's authority to the full extent of the "commerce clause"
of the Constitution by changing the term "commerce" to "in or affecting commerce."
46. See supra note 4.
47. Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022, 20,023 (1976).
[Vol. 44
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reference to purchase money loans (the FTC's adoption of the
close connectedness doctrine) prevents the use of vendor-related or
purchase money loans as a means of separating the duty to pay
from the duty to perform.4 The FTC rule also goes beyond the
remedy afforded by the U3C and allows the consumer to recover
amounts already paid under the contract, including a down-
payment.4
With such an all inclusive and hardhitting regulation protect-
ing consumer interests, it would seem the holder in due course doc-
trine has finally met its demise in the consumer credit market. But
the FTC rule only protects consumers when the required notice is
included in the credit instruments. What happens if, contrary to
the rule, a seller does not include the notice in a consumer credit
contract?
If the FTC finds that a seller has committed an unfair act by
not including the required notice in a consumer contract, it can do
at least two things: (1) issue a cease and desist order requiring the
seller to discontinue the practice;50 (2) take civil action and seek
relief for the consumer. Such action might include one or more of
the following: rescission of the contract, reformation of the con-
tract, refund of money or return of property, and the payment of
damages.5'
These remedies have two serious flaws. First, a court order to
cease and desist rarely aids the consumer whose contract began the
proceedings. Second, the problem the consumer encounters in rely-
ing on the FTC to enforce the rule is that the FTC has very lim-
ited resources. Although any person may request the FTC to make
an investigation,"2 the chance of a positive response is small.53
With limited resources and budget cuts, the FTC would probably
be hesitant to do much for a single party making a complaint, es-
48. Id. at 20,024 (detailed explanation of what types of transactions must contain the
notice).
49. The FTC conditions this statement by asserting that this remedy would only be
available where a seller's breach was so subtantial that a court was persuaded that it was
justified. The most typical example of such a case would involve non-delivery, where deliv-
ery was scheduled after the downpayment was made. FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose,
40 Fed. Reg. 53,524 (1975).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. IV 1974) (If the seller violates the order, civil penalties of
up to $10,000 can be imposed).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975).
52. 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1982).
53. The fiscal 1983 budget for the FTC is $60.8 million. This figure represents an
11.5%, or $7.9 million, reduction from fiscal 1982. Administration requests for fiscal years
1984 and 1985 are $55.1 million and $54.6 million respectively. 561 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
47 (Sept. 27, 1982).
19831
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pecially in Montana with its sparse population." As a practical
matter, the FTC is likely to limit its investigations to cases involv-
ing large numbers of affected parties.5 5 The dismal prospect of en-
forcement by the FTC is darkened further by the absence of a pri-
vate cause of action to enforce compliance with the FTC rule.
VII. THE LACK OF A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE FTC
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE-THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLICATION
Neither section 5 of the FTC Act56 nor the FTC holder in due
course rule5 contains any provision for enforcement by private liti-
gants if the required notice is omitted from a consumer credit con-
tract. Through the use of the doctrine of implication, courts have
found implied private causes of action under federal statutes that
do not expressly provide for such;58 however, no implied cause of
action has been found under the FTC Act. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Holloway v. Bristol Myers
Corp.,59 explained why no private cause of action is granted by the
FTC Act. The court emphasized that the FTC Act was a product
of legislative compromise with its administrative enforcement
scheme purposely chosen. The court reasoned that to allow pri-
vate actions would: (1) pose serious problems to the enforcement
activities of the FTC;60 (2) be inconsistent with the legislative
scheme established by Congress;"1 and (3) interfere with the FTC's
discretion to encourage voluntary compliance without the need to
54. In a 1969 report recommending a private cause of action as a supplement to FTC
actions, the Senate Committee on Commerce recognized that the limited staff and budget of
the FTC would force the agency to allocate its resources to priority cases. The effect would
be to leave thousands of valid cases without a legal remedy if consumers are not allowed a
private cause of action. S. REP. No. 1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970). The bill, S. 3201,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), did not pass.
55. According to the FTC, the budget reductions will be reflected in a shift toward
devoting its resources on a cost-benefit analysis. 529 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9-10 (Feb. 15,
1982).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
57. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-433.3 (1982).
58. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir.
1969) (The Wagner-Peyser National Employment System Act).
59. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Consumers brought a private action against the
makers of Excedrin for false advertising).
60. Id. at 998. The court maintained that the FTC, with its overview of the national
economy, was in a better position than a private litigant to gauge the injury an unfair or
deceptive practice would cause the public and to balance this against the likely cost of elimi-
nating the practice.
61. Id. at 998.
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resort to litigation."2
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the Hol-
loway decision in Carlson v. Coca-Cola Company. 3 A group of in-
dividuals brought an action against the beverage company for an
alleged unfair trade practice as defined by section 5(a)(1) of the
FTC Act. The court, holding that the Act vested remedial power
solely in the FTC, stated: "Section 5(a)(1) equips the Federal
Trade Commission with a flexible tool with which to combat unfair
trade practices. Consumers cannot transmute that tool into a crow-
bar for prying open . . . the federal courthouse. '64
One federal district court 6 has found a private cause of action
under the FTC Act. The facts of that case, however, show that the
FTC had already issued a cease and desist order and that the pri-
vate plaintiff was bringing an action to enforce the order. No other
court has followed this decision, and at least one court has rejected
the holding.6
In Cort v. Ash,17 the United States Supreme Court adopted
the ground rules for applying the doctrine of implication to federal
statutes. The Court held that there are four relevant issues in de-
termining if a private remedy is implicit in a federal statute not
expressly providing one: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class
for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one; (3) whether it is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a rem-
edy for the plaintiff; (4) whether the cause of action is one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law.68
The Supreme Court qualified those four criteria in Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Associa-
tion." The Court said that the key factor to consider is the intent
of the legislature:
'It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a
court must be charry of reading others into it.' [citation omitted]
62. Id. at 1002. '
63. 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
64. Id. at 281.
65. Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
66. Bott v. Holiday Universal Inc., Civ. No. 75-1982 (D.D.C. 1976).
67. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
68. Id. at 78.
69. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent,
we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely
the remedy it considered appropriate."'
There are certainly no strong indications of congressional in-
tent to provide consumers a private cause of action under the FTC
Act. There have been numerous attempts in Congress to amend
the FTC Act to allow private causes of action, but all have failed. 71
Therefore, the decisions after Middlesex have concluded that the
administrative enforcement remedies provided by Congress are the
only remedies Congress has considered appropriate. 2 Without a
private cause of action under the FTC Act, consumer redress is
limited to enforcement by the FTC unless the state in which the
consumer lives has adequate consumer protection statutes.
VIII. MONTANA'S UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
In 1973, the Montana Legislature adopted the Uniform Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act.73 The Act provides
that unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are unlawful. 74 The Act further provides that
due consideration and weight shall be given to the interpretations
of the FTC and the federal courts relating to section 5(a)(1) of the
FTC Act.75 The Act gives any person who purchases or leases
goods or services primarily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses a private cause of action against the seller or lessor if unfair
or deceptive practices are used and result in any ascertainable
lOSS. 76
It would appear that Montana's Consumer Protection Act pre-
70. Id. at 14.
71. E.g., S. 1823, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 14,298 (1971); S. 3201, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 36,598-600 (1969); H.R. 14,931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 35,275 (1969). See also A.B.A., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FTC,
63-64 (1969) (A private right of enforcement was recommended by the ABA). The FTC
itself has recognized that consumers should have a private cause of action under the FTC
Act. See Hearings on Senate Bills 2246 and 3201 Before the Consumer Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1970).
72. See, e.g., Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981); Greenberg v. Michi-
gan Optometric Ass'n Inc., 483 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mich. 1980); cf. Miscellaneous Service
Workers v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1981) (not interpreting the FTC Act,
but used similar analysis).
73. 1973 Mont. Laws, ch. 275, §§ 1-16 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to -
142 (1981)).
74. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (1981).
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (1981).
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1981). The court may award up to three times the
actual damages and reasonable attorney fees.
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vents the use of negotiable instruments and vendor-related loans
in consumer transactions, sinc the FTC holder in due course rule
prevents their use and the Montana Act provides that due consid-
eration and weight shall be given to the interpretations of the
FTC. There is a strong argument, however, that the Montana Act
would not be interpreted as providing this type of protection.
The Uniform Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protec-
tion Act,. 7 from which Montana's version was adopted, contains a
section which specifically forbids the use of cut-off devices in con-
sumer credit transactions.7 When Montana adopted the Act, the
legislature amended the Uniform Act by deleting the section deal-
ing with cut-off devices.7 9 The rest of the Uniform Act was adopted
with only minor changes. Such action is a strong indication that
the intent of the legislature was that the Act was not intended to
apply to cut-off devices, even if the FTC rules that they are an
unfair practice. If that is the case, the consumer is again left with-
out a remedy, or, at best, has the unenviable task of convincing a
district court that the Montana Consumer Protection Act was
meant to prohibit cut-off devices in consumer credit contracts.
IX. CONCLUSION
Consumers and businesses alike benefit from the practice of
selling credit contracts to financial institutions. It becomes an un-
fair trade practice, however, when the consumer's obligation to pay
is separated from the seller's duty to perform. When the seller uses
promissory notes, waiver of defenses clauses, or vendor-related
loans, the consumer is deprived of his most effective
weapon-nonpayment. The consumer is obligated to pay the
holder of the contract or negotiable instrument even if the seller
has not performed. The consumer's only remedy, then, is to sue
the original seller. The cost of such a suit may be prohibitive, and
in many situations the seller turns out to be judgment-proof 80
The FTC holder in due course rule prevents this separation of
duty to pay from duty to perform by requiring the inclusion in the
credit contract of a statement that makes the holder of the con-
tract subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could as-
77. UNIFORM UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 9 (1970), re-
printed in 29 COUNCIL Op STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 141 (1970).
78. Id.
79. House Journal, 43rd Seas. 133 (1973).
80. This is most likely to happen in just the type of situation that brought on the
problem. The seller will not or cannot remedy the problem because he is insolvent, out of
business, or bankrupt.
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sert against the seller. The FTC rule does not provide for a private
cause of action, however, and if the credit contract does not con-
tain the required statement, the consumer is left without an effec-
tive remedy.
It would be a simple matter for Montana to provide a private
cause of action for this type of unfair trade practice. The legisla-
ture could insert the section of the Uniform Unfair Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Act that prohibits cut-off devices
into Montana's version of the Act."
81. It would be best to redraft the section so that it clearly covers the vendor-related
loan situation.
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